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TERRITORIAL POLITICS AND CULTURAL IMPACT

ROBERT W. LARSON

IN 1866 A GRUFF EX-CONFEDERATE SOLDIER arrived in the territory
of New Mexico. His name was Thomas B. Catron, and he hailed
from a state that had provided New Mexico with most of its early
Anglo leaders, Missouri, at the other end of the Santa Fe Trail. A
shrewd and opportunistic young man, Catron quickly perceived
that the only way he could have a successful political or economic
career in this remote frontier territory was to learn Spanish, so he
located in a native village where that was the only language spoken
and soon became fluent. Grounded in the culture and language of
the territory's overwhelming majority, Catron aggressively moved
into the field of law. Again he was successful, becoming one of the
most active and important practicing attorneys in the territory. One
of his legal specialties was to defend native grantees whose lands
awarded under Spanish or Mexican rule were being threatened by
acquisitive Anglo newcomers. A calculating lawyer, he saw the
advantage of taking plentiful land instead of scarce money as his
legal fee, and by 1883 he was reputed to be one of the largest
landowners in the nation.
Catron also had great skills as a politician. During his long tenure
in New Mexico, which fell seventeen years short of spanning the
entire sixty-two years of the state's territorial period, he was the
key person in that nefarious and shadowy political clique, the Santa
Fe Ring. This political ring, which specialized in gaining control
of much of the territory's economic wealth, including its coveted
land grants, provided Catron with much of the support he would
need to win high office. In 1894 he was elected territorial delegate,
receiving important backing from the more afHuent native leaders,
the ricos, as well as from significant numbers of los pobres fot
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whom he had become a revered patron. When New Mexico was
admitted to statehood in 1912, this remarkably astute and successful
Republican was chosen as one of the first two United States. senators. A more impressive success story for a New Mexico Anglo
would be difficult to find.
In many ways Catron's career is symbolic of the traditional scenario of the prominent Anglo achieving success in territorial New
Mexico. As historians of the territorial era have noted, the Anglo,
being a comparative newcomer, started as an outsider, a member
of a small minority. Prior to the seventies, the Anglo population
was small indeed. Col. George A. McCall, whom the Taylor administration sent to New Mexico to assist in the organization of a state
or territory, claimed there were only 1,200 Anglos in 1860; a later
estimate made by the territory's first delegate, Richard T. Weightman, was only half that number. Newcomers from "the States," as
the East was frequently called, usually made business or political
alliances with native New Mexicans; indeed, success in almost anything would have been elusive without at least some cooperation
with the territory's Spanish-speaking majority. Usually the Hispano
ally was wealthy, if not in money then in land. New Mexico historians have customarily labeled such people ricos. The nature of
Anglo relatioNships with less affiuent or less notable Hispanos,
however, is more clouded. Some prominent Anglos, such as Catron,
won through patient and systematic efforts the exalted status 'of
patron. Others apparently confined their cooperation to the more
accessible and "savvy" ricas. But the interaction of Anglos and
Hispanos in all these relationships has usually been viewed as one
of accommodation. Certainly in comparison with other states the
United States acquired as a result of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, this accommodation view appears sound, even though it is
largely derived from studies involving the territory's more affiuent
or influential citizens.
An examination of this accommodation model (here the Catron
model) should illuminate that distinctive brand of cultural politics
practiced in territorial New Mexico. It should also suggest some
provocative questions. For example, was the territory's governance
primarily the handiwork of the much-chronicled alliance involving
ambitious Anglos and those ricos with keen political instincts, or
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were there other important factors that must be considered? What
was the role of the ordinary Spanish-speaking citizen who was
usually rural and often remote from the sources of political power
(a gr~up that many Chicano historians call los pobres because their
material goods were few)? Was there any political role for that third
group in New Mexico's proud cultural triad, the Indian? Of course,
complete answers to these queries will not be possible in a brief
essay, but answers of a suggestive nature are not only possible but
quite illuminating. Indeed, such answers, if carefully developed,
can increase an understanding of what many regard as the most
diverse and fascinating political arena in the American union.
Cultural politics in New Mexico were especially murky in the
beginning. The presence of American troops in 1846, recent conquerors of the territory during the Mexican-American War, muddied New Mexico's political waters as nothing else could. There
was, of course, the abrupt change caused by the reversal of roles;
Anglos replaced Hispanos as leaders of the new power structure
the American Army imposed under the Stars and Stripes. Prominent native New Mexicans willing to cooperate could participate
in the new order, but Anglos would have an influence far beyond
their meager numbers. Curiously, though, the most critical issue
facing the new leadership was the influence of the military in civil
affairs. To some of the recently arrived Anglos the attitude on the
part of many officers that they were superior in authority to civilian
officeholders ran contrary to the nation's traditional constitutional
interpretation. One of these was ex-army paymaster, later territorial delegate, Richard Weightman. Undoubtedly an opportunist,
Weightman carefully began to form political alliances with prominent ricos in much the same way that Catron would two decades
later. During New Mexico's premature effort to achieve statehood
in 1850, Weightman and his allies became vocal statehood boosters.
For support in this effort, they made important advances toward
the Roman Catholic Church, involving in their ranks such prominent members of the Mexican clergy as Jose Manuel Gallegos of
Albuquerque, one of the priests so vividly protrayed in Willa Cather's classic Death Comes for the Archbishop.
Weightman characterized his political opponents as diehard advocates of continued territorial status for New Mexico who were
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influential and powerful only because of their military support.
They were backed by Col. John Munroe, head of the armed forces
in the territory, who allowed them as self-serving Anglos to organize
a territorial party as a vehicle to continue their privileged status.
They were often called the Houghton faction because their leader
was the army-backed judge, Joab Houghton. Although Houghton
and his chief sponsor, Colonel Munroe, were eventually pressured
into supporting statehood for New Mexico by the presidential
administration of Zachary Taylor, the feud between the Weightman
and Houghton factions continued throughout the early territorial
years essentially along the lines of civil-versus-military authority.
At New Mexico's first statehood convention in Santa Fe in May
of 1850, another issue important to native Hispanos arose to divide
the feuding Anglos. It was the heated question of slavery. Of the
two chief rivals, Judge Houghton was an antislavery zealot, who
was determined to see New Mexico become a free state if admission
to the union were inevitable. And his views ultimately prevailed;
slavery was prohibited in the 1850 state constitution. Although
Weightman's views on this issue were somewhat neutral, he would
later fight for the Confederacy. As for the Spanish-speaking majority, it is difficult to conclude that the slavery issue could have
been that vital to them after the terrible recent trauma resulting
from the Conquest. In fact, during the 1850s Hispanos, at least
the ricas, demonstrated a curious ambivalence toward the sectional
controversy. One wealthy Hispano, Miguel A. Otero, who married
a southern belle from Charleston, South Carolina, used his influence while s~rving as territorial delegate during the 1850s to persuade territorial leaders to align themselves with the South on the
sectional question. In 1862 when the Confederates invaded northern New Mexico, however, the overwhelming majority of Spanishspeaking natives remained loyal to the Union. Yet one suspects
that their antipathy toward the Confederates was not so much
because of their slaveholding views as it was their Texas background. Memories of the ill-fated Texas-Santa Fe Expedition of
1841 and land-grabbing activities of Texans in the Mesilla Valley
region probably did more to galvanize resistance to the Confederate
invasion than other questions of morality.
The Union victory in 1865 put an end to the divisive slavery
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issue among the territory's Anglos. The slavery question had survived by many years the often bitter controversy over civil-versusmilitary authority, an issue that declined in importance shortly after
New Mexico received territorial rather than state government under the Compromise of 1850. Now that both issues were dead,
Anglo and native politicians could devote their energies to territorial questions, such as the adjudication of disputed land grant
titles and statehood for New Mexico. The close of the Civil War
also brought more ambitious Anglos to the territory. One particularly important group of new Anglos were the much-heralded
veterans of the California Column, the now-famous military unit
that marched from California to New Mexico to turn back Confederate invaders during the Civil War. Many members of the column
took their discharge in New Mexico to remain in the territory and
to exercise significant influence for years to come. One of them
was Albert J. Fountain who went on to become both the president
of the Territorial Council and speaker of the Territorial House of
Representatives. (Fountain's assassination in New Mexico's isolated
White Sands region in 1896 remains one of the state's more famous
unsolved murders.) Another soldier who served in the California
Column was William L. Rynerson, who won terms in both houses
of the territorial legislature and was an unsuccessful candidate for
territorial delegate in 1884. But some of those who had served the
Confederate cause also came to New Mexico to launch important
careers. Certainly the most noteworthy of these was "Tom" Catron,
the kingpin of our accommodation model.
Catron was the apparent leader of one of the territory's most
controversial institutions, the Santa Fe Ring. Since it was a covert
group of shrewd lawyers and politicians, the ring has been shrouded
in controversy for years. Some New Mexico historians have credited
it with all the questionable manipulations of that selfish alliance of
Anglos and ricos that constitute the core of our accommodation
model. Other historians have contended that no solid proof exists
for such a ring, only accusations of envious or threatened outsiders
alleging its existence. Certainly it would be difficult to place a
beginning or ending date to its activities. Since it was an informal
arrangement, probably a conspiratorial one, it is even difficult to
reconstruct the ring's history or describe accurately its structure.
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Perhaps it was the connecting link between the leadership of the
Democratic and Republican parties in New Mexico. The ring was
certainly bipartisan; it had prominent members from both parties.
If political partisanship was negligible, and the ring was as important as its detractors claim, the territory of New Mexico had what
historian Kenneth N. Owens has called a "no-party" system. In
other words, instead of there being one dominant party or two
healthy rival parties, a cooperative arrangement existed between
the territory's two political organizations that made true partisanship negligible. More important is the objective of the Santa Fe
Ring: its members were dedicated to the acquisition of economic
resources or the special privileges that would make the acquisition
possible. Land acquisition was especially significant, particularly
when it involved the immense tracts ofland awarded under Spanish
and Mexican rule.
Undoubtedly the best contemporary description of the Santa Fe
Ring was that by Territorial Governor Edmund Ross in 1887. Ross,
the courageous man whose refusal to vote against President Andrew
Johnson during the famous impeachment trial of 1868 may have
preserved the integrity of the presidency, was a Cleveland appointee who wanted nothing to do with the selfish machinations
of politicians regardless of their political stripe. In a long letter to
a friend, Ross described the organizers of the Santa Fe Ring as a
~'few sharp shrewd Americans" who purchased at nominal prices a
few small Spanish and Mexican land grants and proceeded to enlarge them by manufacturing titles and lobbying for congressional
recognition. They were largely successful because they had "ingratiated themselves" with New Mexico natives by learning their
language and currying their favor. (The name of Catron immediately comes to mind.) They had, according to an observation related
to Ro~s by an old veteran of the Mexican War, "some legal lore
with a large amount ofcheek and an unusual quantity oflow cunning
and astuteness that always had an inclination to run in a crooked
direction." They were most successful in corrupting some of the
native landowners, too. These Anglos taught Hispanos a "few tricks"
on how "to swell" their holdings to "colossal dimensions," the Anglos
receiving as compensation "large shares of these grants for their
services." Again another characteristic of the Catron model. But
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according to Ross, the Santa Fe Ring was more than a land grant
ring because the opportunities for "speculation and plunder" were
legion. As a consequence, there were "Cattle Rings, Public Land
Stealing Rings, Mining Rings, Treasury Rings, and Rings of almost
every description."
Santa Fe, as the political and commercial capital of New Mexico,
was the logical center for all this ring activity. The lawyers and
businessmen of this important territorial center were in an enviable
position to coordinate this speculation and plundering. And, as Ross
noted, their efforts were bipartisan: at least one Democrat and one
Republican served in every important law firm or commercial enterprise. Consequently, no matter which party was dominant, ring
members were in a position to influence political decisions. In
Catron's Santa Fe law firm, for instance, there were two powerful
Democrats, Charles H. Gildersleeve, who was once accused of
heading a clique of land grabbers, and William C. Thornton, who
was appointed territorial governor of New Mexico during Cleveland's second term. The prevalence of lawyers in the activities of
the Santa Fe Ring almost causes one to conclude that the New
Mexico bar and the Santa Fe Ring were synonymous. Moreover,
as testimony to Santa Fe's importance to the legal profession, ringconnected lawyers in other towns were subordinated to their counterparts in Santa Fe, the "central head." Ross insisted that there
was one lawyer for every ten Anglos in the territory during his
gubernatorial term. Such a figure seems remarkably high, but with
the number of land disputes that needed to be adjudicated in
American law courts the need for lawyers was undeniably great.
A striking aspect about those Anglos alleged to control the Santa
Fe Ring was the immensity of the land tracts they acquired. Catron,
labeled by Ross as one of two originators of the land grant ring
(generally considered synonymous with the Santa Fe Ring), had
an insatiable appetite for land. His holdings included the 593,000
acres of the Tierra Amarilla Grant in northern New Mexico and
southern Colorado, his largest acquisition, and the 240,000 acres
of the Mora Grant flanking the Sangre de Cristos on the east.
Stephen B. Elkins, a two-term territorial delegate and Republican
colleague of Catron who left the territory later to become a United
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States senator from West Virginia and secretary of war under Benjamin Harrjson, was the ring's other organjzer. When he departed
for the East, he left control of the ring in Catron's capable hands.
Despite his departure, Elkins, largely in cooperation with Catron,
could claim at one time a large portion of the Mora Grant and boast
of heing the principal owner of the Ortiz Grant north of Albuquerque. Other prominent Anglo politicians, lawyers, and businessmen were also successful speculators in land and possibly
connected with the Santa Fe Ring. Distinguished Republican Governor Le Baron Bradford Prince, for example, a leading lay Episcopalian with a national reputation, had presumed connections with
the ring; and Max Frost, editor of the Santa Fe New Mexican and
a man who was once indicted in a land fraud prosecution, may also
have been a member of the ring.
- While Ross' remarkable description of the Santa Fe Ring makes
the group appear solely Anglo, it was not. Well-to-do native leaders
were alleged members, benefiting from the sometimes illicit, often
steamroller, tactics of the ring. Antonio Joseph, a Democrat who
served as territorial delegate from 1884 to 1894, was once accused
of being a henchman of the powerful Democratic leader and ring
member, Gildersleeve. Joseph's first election victory was allegedly
engineered by the Santa Fe Ring with the help of a split in the
Republican party. He, too, had land grant holdings and was accused
of manipulating "poor ignorant Mexicans" to acquire his holdings
in the Chama and Ojo Caliente grants. Other Hispanos, or ricos,
to use the preferred term for our accommodation model, were
suspected of ring connections. J. Francisco Chaves, grandson of
one of the Mexican governors and a two-term territorial delegate,
was one. Mariano S. Otero, a shrewd Bernalillo businessman who
also served as territorial delegate, was another. And, the members
of the Perea family, which for a time controlled much of Bernalillo
County, were believed to have strong ring connections; one of the
family, Pedro Perea, was widely regarded as a Catron protege.
Because Ross' description of the Santa Fe Ring is so systematic
and complete, one is strongly inclined to believe most of his allegations. They have the undeniable appeal of a conspiracy theory
that most Americans tend to accept if at all convinCing. But one's
judgment must be tempered; after all, Ross was a fierce opponent
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of the power structure in Santa Fe, whatever it was called. He
arrived as an outsider following his appointment and remained one
throughout his term. Another aspect of the governor's analysis that
should not be accepted uncritically is his description of the interaction between the Anglos and their rico allies. The Anglo is the
catalyst in this relationship; he is the one who teaches the "dirty
tricks" that both will use to swindle or cheat los pobres out of their
lands and other sources of wealth. Although this interpretation
seems convincing, it does not necessarily follow that Anglos will
remain leaders in the resulting selfish conspiracies. Given the power
and prestige that an old or well-placed New Mexico family would
enjoy in a society oflanded aristocrats and beholden rural folk, one
would have to suspect th~t some ricos could do very well on their
own. If accusations of land-grabbing hurled at Antonio Joseph, for
instance, are true, he needed little help from Gildersleeve or any
other calculating Anglo to achieve his economic objectives; he operated effectively on his initiative.
Ross' analysis also suggests that harmony would inevitably result
from such a mutually profitable relationship. With millions of acres
of grant lands up for grabs and the Anglo's needing the rico because
of his connections and the rico's needing the Anglo because of his
legal knowledge, there seems little to cause friction between the
two parties. Yet the two cultural groups were so different that this
assumed harmony cannot be taken for granted. Observations recorded during the Conquest by such Americans as Susan Shelby
Magoffin, Lewis Garrard, and army officer Philip St~ George Cooke
reveal a disdain for all native Hispanos regardless of their social
station. That such an attitude would change in little over one generation seems unlikely. Besides, new Anglos were arriving each
year, and their views toward the Spanish-speaking majority would
have had to change significantly if they resembled in any way the
views of their elected representatives in Washington. Unfair, often
vicious, attacks in Congress against native New Mexicans were,
unfortunately, common during the Gilded Age, particularly on those
occasions when the territory's inhabitants were seeking statehood.
Antonio Joseph, while serving as territorial delegate during the
early nineties, heard his Spanish-speaking constituents criticized
as members of an "Aztec civilization" by a Republican congressman
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and a "race speaking a alien language" by a Populist representative.
Slurs about the territory's dominant religious faith during a debate
over statehood in 1894 caused one fair-minded congressman to ask
his colleagues "whether a man's relIgion is to be made a test of his
fitness for citizenship in the Union?"
Newspapers in the East were even more hostile to New Mexico.
In 1875, for instance, during one of the territory's bids for statehood, a Cincinnati newspaper char~cterized New Mexicans as "aliens to us in blood and language" who would undoubtedly dominate
any new "Catholic State." The Chicago Tribune waged an even
more abusive attack in 1888 when New Mexico sought admission
. under the Springer bill. Territorial natives were maligned as "not
American but 'Greaser,' persons ignorant of our laws, manners,
customs, language, and institutions." The Tribune also printed some
all-too-familiar stereotypes, characterizing native New Mexicans as
illiterate, shiftless, and superstitious.
How many of these negative stereotypes Anglo lawyers and businessmen who comprised the Santa Fe Ring accepted is difficult to
determine. Many of them were undoubtedly distressed by the
knowledge that such attacks on the Hispano majority crippled New
Mexico's statehood efforts, for any delay in admission would adversely affect the ring. It would, for example, deny ring members
opportunities to hold new offices, and several ring leaders coveted
state offices or seats in the United States Congress. Anglos also had
powerful economic reasons for seeking admission; statehood, whenever achieved, would mean increased values for many of their
extensive land speculations. But whether the frustrations caused
by the delay were in any way vented against those ricos involved
in the ring is unclear. More than likely these frustrations were
directed against los pobres. Such anger if manifested in criticism,
however, would have to be low-keyed and private, particularly if
its author had political aspirations in the territory. Mter all, the
Spanish-speaking people remained the electoral majority throughout the remainder of the territorial period. Consequently, when
Melvin W. Mills, a partisan Republican and probable ring member
from Colfax County, characterized the territorial natives as "ignorant people" unfit to govern, he did it in a confidential letter to
his fellow Republican, Gov. L. Bradford Prince.
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Of course, any discussion of the intercultural relationship of Anglos and native New Mexicans must include all Hispanos, including
los pobres. Poorer Hispanos obviously were important in that they
made up in numbers what they lacked in influence, and any attempt
to exclude them from our accommodation model would be ridiculous. Yet sometimes New Mexico historians have done just that,
leaving only ricos to represent the model's native component. Assessing relations between Anglos and poor Hispanos, however, is
a difficult task. For one thing, los pobres left little in the way of
written records, but many ricos, being highly literate (several had
graduated from such Catholic universities as St. Louis and Notre
Dame), gave their side in a record rich in its diversity and extensiveness. Obviously association with the ring is denied or ignored
in all such accounts; instead contributions to the welfare of all native
peoples are stressed. In fact, as a number of these ricas were
powerful, if not generous, patrons, their service to the community
was of unquestioned importance. Indeed, important safeguards for
the Spanish-speaking majority in New Mexico's state constitution
were largely the result of rico participation in the constitutional
convention of 1910. No provision that would work against the welfare of the Hispano majority was allowed in that conservative,
bilingual document. Soloman Luna, the wealthiest sheep owner in
the territory and the most influential native delegate at the convention, had only to "lift a finger or his eyebrows" to st~p any
detrimental proposal.
But what about the interaction between Anglos and los pobres?
How can this relationship fit into the accommodation model? Most
people with even a nodding acquaintance with New Mexico political
history know that the poor and the marginal were often the alleged
victims of land-grabbing, grant stealing, and legal manipulations.
One cannot conclude, however, that there was no accommodation
involving los pobres in this presumably adversarial relationship.
Anglos too acted as patrons, and Catron, once again, is one of the
best examples. Hispanos saw his ability to cater to their needs as
beneficial whether it advanced their true interests or not. Moreover, his political support in the territory's northern counties, where
the majority of native New Mexicans lived, was impressive; he
managed to capture most of these counties during all three of his
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bids for territorial delegate. His being a Republican, of course,
helped because the party, the dominant one during the territorial
period, had established an early alliance with the native majority.
But Catron as the dominant party figure, the "Mr. Republican" of
the territorial G.O.P., was a key person in bringing about this
important accord.
One interesting example of Catron's remarkable hold on the
territory's Spanish-speaking majority occurred in Union County
during Catron's successful bid for delegate in 1894. A number of
Hispanos in that remote county had been attracted to the Populist
party, which had a platform deliberately geared to appeal to people
from humble circumstances. The Populist movement, which managed to garner more than 8 percent of the presidential vote in the
national election of 1892, called for such reforms as government
ownership of the railroads (an appealing issue to people living in
a lonely stockgrazing county that would be adversely affected by
higher freight rates) and a graduated income tax. Other popular
issues included free coinage of silver, direct election of United
States senators, and a shorter work week to benefit the nation's
urban toilers. Many of these new converts to Populism had been
Democrats because throughout the West the often-disenchanted
Democratic party tended to provide more support for Populist goals
than the Republican party. And most were apparently Hispanos;
the members of the Union County Populist party central committee, for example, were Emiterio Gallegos, Mateo Lujan, Saturnio
Pinard, and Francisco Gallegos. Despite this Democratic-Populist
alignment, Catron, working through a Las Vegas attorney named
Lewis C. Fort, managed to win an endorsement for his.Republican
candidacy from the entire Union County Populist organization.
What is so extraordinary about Catron's feat is his ability as an
archconservative to attract members of a party regarded by many
as socialistic. But this is New Mexico, and Catron's success is another example of that unique brand of cultural politics so long
practiced in this state. First and foremost, of course, was Catron's
image as a patron, and thus his role as a friend of the Spanishspeaking people of northern New Mexico was a contributing factor
to his coup: Consider too the crucial favors needed to make a patron
a patron. In 1892, while Catron was maneuvering to control the
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territory's delegation to the Republican national convention, he
promised the citizens of Clayton and Folsom a new county; the
result was Union County created from Colfax and San Miguel counties. Finally, there were the necessary go-betweens that insure the
success of any politically adept patron. Catron's emissary in this
case was Lewis Fort. Fort had gained immense popularity in 1891
when he traveled to Clayton as district attorney of San Miguel to
take into custody a notorious. murderer who killed an old man in
his sleep. The accused killer's abusive statements about Fort during
his trial in Las Vegas could only make him a local hero in northeastern New Mexico. The popular Fort was a persuasive advocate
for Catron's candidacy in 1894.
Certainly Catron was not the only Anglo to appeal to the masses
of ordinary native New Mexicans. Even more successful was Bronson Cutting. An analysis of Cutting does not belong in this study
of territorial politics because his political career soared during the
statehood period when he became a widely respected and powerful
United States senator, but the pattern of political favors that characterized his approach resembles Catron's. He built a bloc of Spanish-speaking voters even more loyal to him than Catron's native
supporters were to the veteran territorial leader. Moreover, as a
political maverick, Cutting, a nominal Republican, was able to lead
his Hispano backers in and out of the Republican party as he
switched parties from election to election to pursue his more liberal
policies. Cutting's favors also took the form of loans to constituents
(another Catron tactic). But in Cutting's case, the amount of the
loans he extended was astonishingly large. Cutting, at the time of
his death from a plane crash in 1935, left $500,000 worth oflargely
unpaid loans to nearly 500 constituents. Many unpaid loans were
to Hispanos.
If the relations that Catron and Cutting had with los pobres were
typical of all Anglo leaders, then our accommodation model would
seem most appropriate in describing interaction between almost
all Anglos and Hispanos in New Mexico. Ricos cooperated with
Anglos through arrangements such as the Santa Fe Ring for the
mutual benefit of both, but los pobres tended to support Anglos
because of favors extended to them by leaders of the Anglo community. Accommodation, then, is the byword; it best describes
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relations between these two dominant cultural groups of territorial
New Mexico.
True? Of course not. Historians have long recognized the frictions that existed between these two cultural groups, frictions that
tended to surface dramatically during such well-publicized confrontations as the Maxwell Land Grant controversy, the Lincoln
County War, the White Cap raids, and the relatively recent raid
of Reies Lopez Tijerina and his Alianza supporters on the Tierra
Amarilla courthouse. But most New Mexico historians, including
this writer, have looked upon these celebrated conflicts in New
Mexico history as aberrations, and the numerous books about the
conflicts have, for the most part, treated them as such. Scholars
have rarely viewed these encounters as part of a broader struggle
pitting Anglos against Hispanos, a conflict that could discredit at
least a part of the accommodation model involving Anglos and los
pobres. Viewing these struggles as exceptions to the rule, of course,
means viewing the violent behavior of the native New Mexicans
involved as exceptional; thus the more familiar characterization of
territorial Hispanos as a patient, accepting, even docile people has
been allowed to prevail. Recent research, including that of this
. author, does not support these mild traits of behavior, particularly
when the legitimate rights of these native peoples were being
threatened or challenged.
One must, in fact, modify this accommodation view of intercultural relations and territorial politics so that the deep differences
that existed between Anglos and Hispanos of more humble means
be recognized. While the intercultural relations in territorial New
Mexico were more harmonious than in other parts of the Spanishspeaking Southwest, to argue this point without honest assessment
of the differences that often prevailed is to present an incomplete
and, therefore, inaccurate argument.
The major cause of these differences that led to confrontations
and violence was rivalry over land. Perhaps in no other state in
the union has land been more important as a cause of conflict than
in New Mexico. New Mexico'sdubious record of having more political assassinations than any other state is largely attributable to
struggle for land or the economic power associated with landholding. Clearly,· princely tracts of that coveted commodity awarded
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under Spanish or Mexican authority led to warfare in Colfax and
San Miguel counties. The struggles in both these counties have
been dealt with extensively, but, as previously mentioned, these
conflicts have been chronicled as exceptions rather than the rule
in analyzing the actions of participants. Land grants, however, were
not the only reason for violence; disputed grants of land were not
located in Lincoln County or in those parts of Rio Arriba and San
Juan counties where competition for land existed between Anglos
and Hispanos. So competition for all kinds ofland has characterized
much of this violence and has made the term accommodation inappropriate in describing some aspects of intercultural relations in
New Mexico.
Historian Robert Rosenbaum, who has conducted extensive research into violence as a native response to Anglo intrusion, has
done the most convincing job of defining the geographical region
in New Mexico where most of these serious intercultural confrontations occurred. He has described the "battle zone" as a region
extending from San Juan County in the northwest across the northern boundary of the state to the Sangre de Cristos and down the
eastern flank of that range into Lincoln County, which at one time
encompassed the entire southeastern corner of the state. Here
native frontiersmen moved during the late eighteenth century and
early nineteenth century in a movement that noted historical geographer Donald W. Meinig has characterized as a "spontaneous folk
migration. "
The problems began when Anglos moved into the same regions
during the latter half of the nineteenth century. The most typical
response of these native land claimants, many of whom held the
lands of this region in common, was extended resistance or opposition in what some modern historians and social scientists have
called long-term skirmishing. Such resistance occurred in Rio Arriba County and the more recently created San Juan County to the
west. Sometimes this resistance was a long-delayed process; in parts
of Rio Arriba County, for instance, n~tive settlers ignored Anglo
intruders until the very lands that they were cultivating or grazing
were threatened. Where Anglo iI!trusion was more dramatic and
aggressive, this skirmishing occurred sooner and tended toaccelerate into more serious violence. The wars in Lincoln County are
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the best example of this kind of conflict. Although historians have
been inclined to' concentrate on the feud between the McSween
and Murphy-Riley-Dolan factions that erupted in 1878, the rivalry
over land and water rights in Lincoln County began a decade before
and ended a decade after 1878 and involved Hispanos to a far
greater degree than previously recognized. Few historians, for instance, have dealt with the Horrell War, where native Hispanos
struggled to preserve their rights to the land, than with the legendary Lincoln County War. Moreover, far more attention has been
paid to such Lincoln County participants as Billy the Kid than to
such important native leaders as Juan Patron.
The same could be said of the long-term skirmishing along the
eastern side of the Sangre de Cristo Mountains in Colfax County
where the'famous Maxwell Land Grant was located. Most chronicles of the Maxwell controversy-and there have been some excellent ones-have concentrated on either the Anglo grant owner
or the Anglo resisters. Much less has been done with the native
resistance to the Maxwell claimants, which started later but was
in some respects more effective. In San Miguel County to the south.
an even more impressive show of native resistance occurred. As a
matter of fact, one should upgrade the resistance of Las Gorras
Blancas (White Caps) to Anglo encroachment in San Miguel to the
level of a coordinated rebellion, a term some historians and social
scientists use today to describe a much more advanced, better
planned show of resistance. In San Miguel another land grant was
involved, the Las Vegas Community Grant, and the better organized resisters were the heretoforementioned Las Gorras Blancas.
These resisters not only responded with force to immediate threats
to their land but established an alliance with a liberal Anglo union,
the Knights of Labor, and cooperated with more progressive-minded
Anglos in a political party, the Populist party or El Partido del
Pueblo, which agitated for the eventual incorporation of the grant
under the jurisdiction of the town of Las Vegas. These largely
successful Gorras came closer to perceiving their movement as one
representing small Hispano landowners everywhere than any group
or organization until Tijerina's Alianza was founded. Of course, Las
Gorras did not include all Hispanos in their social thinking; the
concept of a universal struggle was to elude them just as it did
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most of the followers of Tijerina, who were probably more concerned with the ancient land claims oftheir family than with general
welfare of Hispanics.
Clearly, this pattern of native resistance has not been fully understood or appreciated, but also it has not been adequately studied.
More articles and monographs are needed on this subject. For
instance, the territorial activities of native resisters in Rio Arriba
County have been almost ignored. Histories of the resistance in
Lincoln County hav~ been largely confined to the famous range
war of 1878, and accounts of the Colfax County War that erupted
because of the Maxwell Land Grant have focused on the Anglos
involved. While White Cap resistance in San Miguel has attracted
a more recent crop of historians, they have not been entirely successful in putting the efforts of these native night riders in the
broader historical perspective.
New research will not lead to simple answers. Indeed, reinterpretation may be thwarted by an array of frustrating complications.
Obviously some of the Anglo intruders were important grant-hungry capitalists. Catron, for example, was involved in the struggles
in Rio Arriba, along with Thomas Burns and two aggressive English
companies, the Rio Arriba Land and Cattle Company and the Carlisle Cattle Company. The man for whom the accommodation model
fits best was also allied with the Murphy-Riley-Dolan faction in the
Lincoln County War and was for a brief time co-owner of the
sprawling Maxwell Grant. On the other hand, many of the Anglo
intruders on the eastern plains were small settlers or westering
cowboys whose one aim was to extinguish the claims ofAnglo grant
speculators and native grantees so that the entire area could be
declared public domain and openoed to any enterprising homesteader. Also, there are cases where the Anglo landowner and the
native landowner made common cause against the powerful Anglo
speculator in alliance with the ricos.
On the basis of this newer interpretation or hypothesis, where
does the accommodation model stand? It appears intact concerning
relations between the more powerful and educated Anglos and their
rico allies. Outside this relationship, however, the term accommodation may not be accurate; the growing evidence of widespread
conflict between Anglos and los pobres has already been cited as
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evidence that confrontation may be the more appropriate term.
Other questions regarding cultural interaction should also be addressed. What type of relations existed, for instance, outside that
peripheral region of conflict that extended in an arc from San Juan
County to Lincoln in the southeast? Did Anglos and Hispanos of
ordinary means living in the more crowded Rio Grande Valley
accommodate their conflicting desires and needs to achieve greater
harmony?
One New Mexico historian, Gustav L. Seligmann, Jr., has suggested that many territorial Hispanos employed withdrawal as a
mechanism to deal with aggressive Anglo intruders. Withdrawal,
however, is not an accommodating action if harmonious relations
are the objective. As for Indians, the third group in the state's
cultural mix, they remained remote from the day-to-day social and
political activities of mainstream New Mexico life. Although Pueblo
Indians were involved in the Taos uprising of 1847 and some nomadic tribes were engaged in bloody violence as late as the eighties,
as wards of the federal government, Indians stayed detached from
territorial life even though their votes were sometimes solicited
during the early days following the Conquest. The whole concept,
then, of accommodation as a major characteristic of cultural interaction in territorial New Mexico is one that should be challenged,
studied, and probably modified.
But any reassessment of New Mexico's cultural relations should
not be confined to the political or economic realm. The social arena
is also a legitimate area for fresh examination. Intermarriage was
common in territorial New Mexico, yet most would concede that
the implications of this important social practice have never been
adequately studied. Relations involving Anglo and Hispano women
are just beginning to command the attention of historians. Other
facets of social interaction such as the influence of Protestant missionaries on native peoples also need further study to ascertain the
degree to which accommodation characterized cultural relations in
New Mexico.
The results of this proposed reassessment would not undercut
significantly the proud record of cultural harmony from which the
citizens of this state draw great pride. After all, two governors of
Hispanic background have served this state in the past decade, not
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to mention the members of this cultural heritage who have served
in Washington during these past years. A new assessment would,
however, show that healthy racial and cultural relations are rarely
achieved without struggle. It would also set the record straight
from a historical standpoint, a worthy objective for any free society.
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